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DUQUESNE NATURAL GAS CO. V. FEFOLT:
RESERVATION OF ONE-EIGHTH INTEREST
IN GAS AND OIL-ESTATE IN LAND
OR PERSONALTY IN
PENNSYLVANIA?
In Duquesne Natural Gas Co. v. Fefolt,1 the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania held that a reservation 2 of an equal one-eighth part of all gas and
oil produced and saved as consideration for an oil and gas lease is real prop-
erty. The purpose of this Note is to set forth the principles involved in three
basic methods of creating interests in oil and gas-license, lease and sale-all
commonly referred to as leases, and to examine these concepts with a view
toward explaining how the superior court reached the decision that oil and
gas royalties are real property. Furthermore, the Note will suggest how the
courts might reach a decision more in accord with Pennsylvania law and with
the intent of the parties to the original agreement.
In Pennsylvania, oil and gas are considered to be minerals, 3 belonging
to the owner as part of the land, so long as they are within the boundaries of
the estate.4 They can be sold apart from the surface and apart from other
minerals beneath it.5 The agreement of sale can effect a severance, creating
a separate freehold of inheritance in the oil and gas.
6
The question of whatever gas and oil royalties are to be treated as realty
or personalty is important in regard to at least three areas: (1) how the
1. 203 Pa. Super. 102, 198 A.2d 608 (1964).
2. A reservation is "a clause in a deed or other instrument of conveyance by which
the grantor creates, and reserves to himself, some right, interest, or profit in the -estate
granted, which had no previous existence as such, but is first called into being by the
instrument reserving it.... ".BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). (Emphasis
added.)
The reservation is to be distinguished from an exception. An exception withholds
from the operation of the grant something in existence. Lacey v. Montgomery, 181 Pa.
Super. 640, 648, 124 A.2d 492, 496 (1956). A rent payment is a "reservation" because
the rent is brought into existence by the conveyance. The withholding of the northeast
section from the conveyance of a tract of land would be an "exception" because the
northeast section was in existence prior to the grant and the exception operated on the
description of the land conveyed.
3. Since oil and gas are minerals the same doctrines of ownership apply to them as
apply to solid minerals, such as coal and limestone. Hamilton v. Foster, 272 Pa. 95, 103,
116 Atl. 50, 52 (1922) ; Rockwell v. Warren County, 228 Pa. 430, 431, 77 Atd. 665
(1910) ; Stoughton's Appeal, 88 Pa. 198, 201 (1879) ; Prager's Estate, 74 Pa. Super.
592, 595 (1920). See also Penn-Ohio Gas Co. v. Frank's Heirs, 322 Pa. 233, 237, 185
Atl. 280, 281 (1936) ; City of Erie v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 278 Pa. 512, 520, 123 Atl. 471,
474-475 (1924). Therefore, where it is helpful, cases involving solid minerals have been
cited.
4. City of Erie v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 278 Pa. 512, 520, 123 Atl. 471, 474 (1924).
5. Ibid.
6. Id. at 521, 123 Atl. at 475.
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royalty is to be taxed ;7 (2) whether the heir or personal representative takes
the royalty interest upon the death of the owner ;8 and (3) whether the royalty
passes by deed.9
The lease in the Duquesne case was as follows:
[A] . . . hereby grants unto . . . [B] . . . its successors and
assigns, all the oil and gas in and under the following described
premises, with the right to use as much water as may be necessary
in its operations, together with the rights of ingress and egress at all
times for the purpose of drilling and operating for oil, gas or water
and to conduct all operations, erect such buildings and tanks and lay
and maintain all pipes necessary for the production and transporta-
tion of oil, gas or water, and remove all said pipes and property
during or after the termination of this grant; reserving however,
to first party the equal one-eighth (8) part of all oil produced and
saved from said premises, to be delivered in the pipe line to the
credit of first party free of charge. . . . [I]f and as long as gas is
found in sufficient quantity to convey to market, the consideration
in full to the grantor for each and every well so producing gas upon
said land, shall be as follows: Ysth part of all gas sold from each
well. 10
The real estate which was still retained by A was conveyed to several suc-
cessive grantees ending with C. An interpleader in equity was filed by D
as assignee of B, the original lessee, to determine whether D should pay the
royalties to A, the original grantor, or to C, the successive grantee of A.
A contended that the conveyance between A and B caused a complete
severance of all oil and gas in the land, thereby creating a separate freehold;
that the reservation of a one-eighth interest in the oil and gas was personalty,
and did not pass by conveyance of the retained real estate to C.
C contended that A conveyed only seven-eighths of the oil and gas to B;
that the reservation of the one-eighth interest remained vested as real prop-
erty in A, and passed by deed to C. The superior court agreed with C and
held he was entitled to the royalty payments.
The superior court dealt with a similar problem in Prager's Estate."
7. Real property and personal property are taxed on a different basis. Rockwell
and Co. v. Warren County, 228 Pa. 430, 77 Atl. 665 (1910).
8. Real property, upon the death of the owner, passes directly to his heir, while the
title to personal property vests in the decedent's personal representative. Prager's Estate,
74 Pa. Super. 592, 594 (1920). See Wettengel v. Gormley, 184 Pa. 354, 362, 39 Atl. 57,
58 (1898) ; Fairchild v. Fairchild, 6 Sadler 231, 241, 9 Atl. 255, 256 (Pa. 1887).
9. If the royalty is regarded as personalty, it is treated as purchase money for the
oil and gas. It then would remain payable to the grantor and not the grantee of a
subsequent conveyance of a remaining interest in the land. If the royalty is considered to
be real property, it runs with the land to a subsequent grantee as a rent payment. See
Brunot's Estate, 41 Pittsb. Leg. J.N.S. 105 (Pa. C.P. 1898).
10. Brief for Appellants, pp. 24a-25a.
11. 74 Pa. Super. 592 (1920).
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Prager involved an oil and gas lease, which differed from the Duquesne
lease in only one material respect. It was limited to a term of years or so
long as gas or oil could be produced in paying quantities. 12 The Prager case
held that the grantor's interest-
. . . was limited to the purchase money, that is, to the payment of a
certain amount of money proportioned to the amount and pressure
of the gas used off the premises and marketed, and to one-eighth of
the oil "produced and saved" from the premises, and was personal
property which, at his death, vested in his executor and did not pass
to his devisee .... 13
The court further said that payment of the purchase money in the form of
royalties rather than in one lump sum did not change the character of the
estate conveyed from personalty to realty. Similarly, the personal property
interest retained by the grantor did not pass by his deed of his remaining
interest in the real estate to a subsequent grantee.
14
The court in the Duquesne case, without overruling or distinguishing
Prager's Estate, decided that the royalty interest was realty, partially on the
basis of the more recent decision in Penn-Ohio Gas Co. v. Frank's Heirs.x5
The Penn-Ohio case involved an oil and gas lease providing for payment of
one-eighth of the oil produced and three hundred dollars for each gas well.
The grantors retained the right to declare a forfeiture of the lease unless at
least one producing well was completed in three months or unless the grantee
paid a rental of twenty-five cents per acre for each additional three-month
period during which completion was delayed. The question involved was
whether the grantor's heirs could forfeit the rights of the grantee under the
lease for the nonpayment of the sums stipulated to be paid for each gas well.
The court construed the forfeiture clause narrowly and held that it only
applied to the nonpayment of the twenty-five cents an acre rental provision
and did not apply to the gas well payments. 16 That the decision in no way
labeled the royalty interest is made clear by this statement from the court:
12. If oil and gas is found in sufficient quantities to pay a reasonable profit on the
sum required to be expended it is considered to be found in paying quantities. See Pelham
Petroleum Co. v. North, 78 Okl. 39, 188 P. 1069 (1920).
13. 74 Pa. Super. 592, 594 (1920). (Emphasis added.)
14. That the consideration money for the oil was "reserved" in the deed of
conveyance to Cypher [grantee] did not create a technical reservation, for no
oil was reserved in place but only one-eighth of what was produced and saved,
that is, one-eighth of what was produced after it was raised to the surface and
had become personal property. . . . If George Prager [grantor], after his deed
to Cypher, had conveyed the farm to one with notice of the prior grant of the
oil and gas, he would have taken only what real estate was left in the grantor,
and would have not been entitled to the royalties from the oil and gas previously
conveyed. . ..
Id. at 596.
15. 322 Pa. 233, 185 At. 280 (1936).
16. Id. at 238, 185 Atl. at 282.
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[T]he term by which these payments are designated does not affect
the decision of this case, and . . . it is not necessary at this time to
determine their precise character, but we cannot agree with the inter-
pretation by the court below of the forfeiture provision.
17
In addition to the Penn-Ohio case the Duquesne court also cited Barns-
dall v. Bradford Gas Co.,18 for the proposition that a royalty interest is real
property. Barnsdall held that the instrument in dispute created a lease, rather
than a license to enter and operate for oil and gas. The reason for this
decision was that the agreement granted the land itself and not simply the
the right to enter, prospect and remove oil and gas. Therefore, the lessee could
sue in ejectment, a remedy that a mere licensee could not utilize. The court in
the Barnsdall decision said that the title to the oil, except for the one-eighth
royalty interest, vested in the lessee. The court did not discuss the nature of
this excepted interest, since that question was not before it. However, by
stating that title to one-eighth of the oil did not vest in the lessee, the court
would seem to imply that it remained in the grantor as an exception from
the grant, and was therefore, a realty interest.
It has been about one hundred years since oil and gas were produced
in paying quantities in Pennsylvania. 9 During this period there have been
changes in the type of contracts employed to define the relationship between
the owner of the land and those who propose to remove the oil and gas.2 0
These may be divided into three groups-licenses, leases, and sales.21 A
license grants a right to produce gas and oil with the right to use as much
of the land as is necessary to accomplish this purpose.2 2 Only the licensee
can exercise the rights created by the license.23 When the license is granted
the legal title to the land, including the oil and gas, remains in the grantor.
Title to the minerals passes to the licensee only upon their severance from
the land.
2 4
The lease25 is limited to a certain number of years.2 6 It passes to the
17. Id. at 236, 185 Atl. at 281.
18. 225 Pa. 338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909).
19. See Appeal of Baird, 132 Pa. Super. 573, 580, 1 A.2d 485, 488 (1938); McManus
v. Acklin, 62 Pa. D. & C. 527, 529 (C.P. 1947).
20. Ibid.
21. See Appeal of Baird, 132 Pa. Super. 573, 580, 1 A.2d 485, 488 (1938); McManus
v. Acklin, 62 Pa. D. & C. 527, 530-531 (C.P. 1947).
22. See Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229 (1866).
23. See II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.77 (Casner ed. 1952).
24. See Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229 (1866).
25. There have been many types of agreements used to define the rights and duties
between grantor and grantee concerning oil and gas. All of these are referred to in the
decisions as leases. In this part of the Note, the term "lease" refers to a lease as thought
of in popular terms, i.e., an ordinary farm lease with the additional right to remove oil
and gas.
26. E.g., Irwin v. Hoffman, 319 Pa. 8, 179 Atl. 41 (1935); Nesbit v. Godfrey, 155
1965]
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grantees a corporeal estate (a leasehold of the necessary surface) with the
exclusive right to take the oil and gas.27 This agreement may be Called a
leasehold without impeachment of waste concerning the oil and gas, since
these minerals can be removed by the lessee.28 When an oil and gas lease is
construed as an ordinary lease the royalties run with the land.29 It is sub-
mitted that these royalties are in the nature of rent. Unless rent is specifically
excepted, it passes or runs with the land upon the conveyance of the reversion
to which the rent is an incident.30 The lessee "is not an absolute owner of
the whole of the oil as he would be were all the oil in place conveyed to him
in fee." 3' 1 Part of the interest remains in the grantor as real estate-a rever-
sion to which the royalties are attached as an incident.
For years after oil and gas were discovered in substantial quantities in
Pennsylvania, the lease and the license were the most popular contract forms
employed to convey interests in these minerals. The courts, recognizing that
gas and oil were minerals with peculiar attributes, looked upon them as
minerals ferae naturae-2 because they had the power to escape without the
desire of the owner. Because of this fugitive characteristic, parties seldom
entered into agreements creating separate fees in oil and gas.
As the courts began to realize that oil and gas, like other minerals, are
"confined in certain underlying strata and [are] . . . a part of the land in
the same manner as underlying coal or other minerals . . .- 33 the sale became
a more acceptable means of creating oil and gas interests. It appears that
the ferae naturae concept has now been rejected in Pennsylvania. 4 Oil and
gas are presently treated like other minerals in that there can be a complete
severance of them.3 5 Because of their fugacious or migratory nature there
Pa. 251, 25 Atl. 621 (1893) ; Brown v. Beecher, 120 Pa. 590, 603, 15 Atl. 608, 608-609
(1888). But cf. Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909).
27. E.g., McKean Natural Gas Co. v. Walcott, 254 Pa. 328, 98 Atl. 955 (1916)
Westmoreland Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 Atl. 724 (1889); Chicago and
Allegheny Oil and Mining Co. v. U.S. Petroleum Co., 57 Pa. 83 (1868). But cf. Barnsdall
v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909).
28. See Denniston v. Haddock, 200 Pa. 426, 428, 50 Atl. 197, 197 (1901), where
the court noted that this is how the agreement was characterized at common law.
29. See Bryant v. Morgan, 51 Pittsb. Leg. J. 53 (Pa. C.P. 1903).
30. See generally CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN
WITH LAND" 187-96 (2d ed. 1947).
31. Duke v. Hague, 107 Pa. 57, 66 (1884).
32. Westmoreland and Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 249-250,
18 At. 724, 725 (1889).
33. McManus v. Acklin, 62 Pa. D. & C. 527, 530 (C.P. 1947).
34. See City of Erie v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 278 Pa. 512, 520-521, 123 Atl. 471,
474-475 (1924) ; Blakely v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 429, 34 Atl. 564, 565 (1896) ; Prager's
Estate, 74 Pa. Super. 592, 595 (1920).
35. See City of Erie v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra note 34, at 520, 123 Atd. at 475
(1924) ; Hamilton v. Foster, 272 Pa. 95, 102, 116 Atl. 50, 52 (1922) ; Prager's Estate, 74
Pa. Super. 592 (1920).
[Vol. 69
are certain distinctions between oil and gas on the one hand and fixed or
solid materials on the other, but there is no difference with regard to the
interest that can be created in them by deed.
36
The court in Duquesne stated that the severance which creates a separate
freehold in the oil and gas occurs when all the oil or gas itself is conveyed
in fee.3 7 The interest conveyed has been treated as a separate fee when the
mineral has been granted for a term of years and as long thereafter as the
mineral could be produced in paying quantities.38 The question arises as to
the classification of the interest in the oil and gas that the grantor retains.
To create a reversion the grantor must convey an estate of a lesser quantum
than that which he had before the conveyance.3 9 In an oil and gas lease
which creates a separate fee the grantor conveys all of his interest in the
oil and gas. He retains no reversion. The interest the grantor reserves in
the oil and gas is that sometime in the future these minerals may become
exhausted and the land from which they were removed will return to the
grantor or his heirs. It could be argued that this interest should properly be
termed a possibility of reverter because the grantor conveyed an estate in the
oil and gas of the same quantum that he had before the conveyance. The
interest of the grantee in such a situation would be a determinable fee limited
by the express or implied 40 provision that it will last only so long as oil or gas
exist at all or in paying quantities, and would terminate automatically upon
the exhaustion of the mineral. Therefore, it is submitted that in the Duquesne
case A retained a possibility of reverter and not a reversion in the oil and gas.
If there were no reversion there was nothing to which the royalties could
attach as incidents in order to run with the land in the subsequent conveyance
to C. This is because A had conveyed all his interest (the same quantum as
A had) in the oil and gas to B. There is a logical inconsistency in this prop-
osition because it has been stated that the grantor retains a possibility of
reverter. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the Duquesne court was not im-
plying that an incident can attach to a possibility of reverter. Generally, the
possibility of reverter is ignored and the cases state that the only interest
the grantor has in the created fee is a right to the purchase money in the form
of royalties paid in installments.
4 '
The court in Duquesne concluded that the agreement between A and B
36. Prager's Estate, supra note 35, at 595.
37. 203 Pa. Super. at 104, 198 A.2d at 610 (1964).
38. See Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 347 Pa. 290, 32 A.2d 227 (1943) ; Prager's
Estate, 74 Pa. Super. 592 (1920). Contra, Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338,
74 At. 207 (1909).
39. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.12 (Casner ed. 1952).
40. Id. at § 4.13.
41. E.g., Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 347 Pa. 290, 297, 32 A.2d 227, 232 (1943);
Prager's Estate, 74 Pa. Super. 592, 594 (1920).
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was a sale, severing the oil and gas from the rest of the real estate, and
thereby creating a separate freehold of inheritance. To this conclusion it
applied the principle of an ordinary lease that the grantee was not "an abso-
lute owner of the whole" 42 but only an owner of seven-eighths of the oil and
gas in place. The superior court reasoned that the one-eighth royalty interest
remained in the grantor as a realty interest in the oil and gas in place. It
treated the one-eighth interest of the grantor as a vested interest-a reversion
to which the royalties attached and therefore ran with the land to C. It would
seem that the court in Duquesne confused the principles creating a sale with
those of a lease in holding that the royalties ran with the land to C.
The general rule in Pennsylvania is that a royalty interest is personal
property when the conveyance is a sale, and therefore it is treated as a
covenant to pay which is personal to the grantor." Concerning oil and gas
conveyances, only one Pennsylvania case has held,"4 and one implied,45 that
the royalty interest is an exception from the grant which remains in the
grantor as real property when the conveyance is by sale causing a severance. 46
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Smith v. Glen-Alden Coal Co.,
47
questioned 4 the superior court case of Burke v. Kerr.49 Burke held that when
the grantor leased all the limestone under a certain tract of land for a royalty
the grantor retained an interest in the limestone which was real property
and therefore subject to the lien of a judgment. Smith held that a lease of
all the coal in place leaves the grantor with an interest in the royalties to be
paid under the lease, and that this interest is personalty. The court stated:
It is a necessary corollary that if the fee to the severed coal is vested
in the lessee no interest in the coal as real property remains in the
lessor and that his only interest therein is personal property. The
lessor's interest is properly termed a possibility of reverter.50
This language seems to clearly indicate the proper classification of the
interest created by a lease that causes a severance of the mineral under
consideration. Smith and Burke dealt with solid minerals-coal and limestone
-which have characteristics different from oil and gas. However, as stated
42. See Duke v. Hague, 107 Pa. 57, 66 (1884).
43. See Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 347 Pa. 290, 298-300, 32 A.2d 227, 232-233
(1943) ; Robinson v. Pierce, 278 Pa. 372, 123 Atl. 324 (1924) ; Fairchild v. Fairchild,
6 Sadler 231, 9 Att. 255 (Pa. 1887) ; Prager's Estate, 74 Pa. Super. 592 (1920) ; Brunot's
Estate, 40 Pittsb. Leg. J.N.S. 105, 107 (1898).
44. Appeal of Baird, 132 Pa. Super. 573, 1 A.2d 485 (1938).
45. Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 343, 74 Atl. 207, 208 (1909).
46. This conclusion has been adopted in at least one other jurisdiction. See Hager v.
Stakes, 116 Tex. 435, 294 S.W. 835 (1927).
47. 347 Pa. 290, 32 A.2d227 (1943).
48. Id. at 300-02, 32 A.2d at 333-34.
49. 142 Pa. Super. 37, 15 A.2d 685 (1940).
50. 347 Pa. at 301, 32 A.2d at 233.
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above,5l the fugacious character of oil and gas does not prevent a creation
of a separate fee by grant. Nevertheless, while overruling Burke in fact,
the Smith court refused to come out in its opinion and directly overrule the
superior court decision. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania felt that the
principles of stare decisis prevented it from doing so, and because of the
fact that the Burke decision held only that the royalty was subject to the lien
of a judgment.
That the intention of the parties, and particularly of the grantor, is to
be carried out whenever possible is one of the primary rules to be followed
in determining the meaning of a conveyance.5 2 In Duquesne A granted to B
all the oil and gas, reserving to A one-eighth of all oil produced and saved
and also one-eighth of all gas sold from each well. A, the grantor, expressly
used the term "reserving." A reservation narrows or limits that which the
grantee takes. It retains in the grantor some right over the property but
does not effect the description of the property granted. 53 On the other hand,
an exception withholds from the operation of the deed something which
without the exception would pass to the grantee. An exception operates upon
the description, withdrawing the excepted property from it.5 4 In Duquesne, A
did not limit the amount of oil and gas granted or exclude any part of it
from the grant. A created a new right by the conveyance; that is, a right
to the purchase money paid in the form of royalties. This right was a
reservation-not an exception-of oil and gas in place.
In Appeal of Union Oil Co.,55 the court held that where, the oil royalty
was to be paid from a ". . . product produced on or from said piece of land
• . .-56 this did not create an exception of the oil and gas in place. The
quoted language above was used to designate a right in the grantor to one-
eighth of the oil when and if produced. It would seem to be reasonable to
assume that the words "produced and saved," as used in the Duquesne case,
were intended to have a similar meaning. The oil and gas is not produced
until brought to the surface and severed from the fee. When severed, the
oil and gas become subjects of commerce like any other product of the field,
forest, or mine57 and constitute personal property.5 8
Construing a royalty interest as an exception of a certain percentage of
oil and gas in place and thereby labeling it realty causes an undesirable legal
51. See notes 36 and 37 supra and accompanying text.
52. See Lacey v. Montgomery, 181 Pa. Super. 640, 648, 124 A.2d 492, 496 (1956).
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. 3 Penny. 504 (Pa. 1883) (the case involved an oil lease).
56. Id. at 505. (Emphasis added.)
57. See City of Erie v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 278 Pa. 512, 521, 123 Atl. 471, 475
(1924).
58. 24 P.L.E. Mining, Oil and Gas § 11, at 141 (1960).
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consequence. If one-eighth of oil and gas in place remains in the grantor,
the grantor and the grantee would be tenants in common59 because the
only requirement necessary to have a tenancy in common is unity of pos-
session. 60 Unity of possession is present in the Duquesne case only if the
one-eighth royalty interest is determined to be real property-an exception
of one-eighth of the oil and gas in place. There would be nothing to prohibit
the grantor from drilling for his one-eighth interest, because one co-tenant
may use and enjoy all of the property as if he were the sole owner, provided
his behavior does not bar the other co-tenants from enjoying their respective
shares of the benefits.61 It is not unusual for an interest in an oil and gas
lease to amount to one-three hundredth of the whole. 62 Thus, all of the
realty owners could drill for their respective interests in the oil and gas.
Needless to say, this would create unsurmountable problems in the oil and
gas industry. However, if the royalty interest is determined to be a personal
property right, the owner of the right would not be a tenant in common with
the grantee because there would be no unity of possession in the oil and
gas estate. The only interest the grantor would have in the severed fee of
oil and gas would be personal right to the purchase money paid in install-
ments in the form of royalties.
63
CONCLUSION
The courts call the contracts used to define the rights and duties of
parties entering into oil and gas agreements-leases. 64 This is an unfortunate
situation because it leads to misunderstanding. If the courts would first decide
whether the "lease" is in fact a lease, a license or a sale, much of the diffi-
culty would be eliminated. This classification should be based on a reasonable
interpretation of the intent of the parties as manifested in the particular
instrument. If this were done, legal principles appropriate to the type of
agreement under consideration could be applied with a resulting consistency
of interpretation with regard to each type of instrument.
ROGER B. CUBBAGE
59. See Appeal of Union Oil Co., 3 Penny. at 506 (Pa. 1883).
60. See II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.5 (Casner ed. 1952).
61. See IV POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 603 (1954).
62. See Appeal of Baird, 132 Pa. Super, 573, 576, 1 A.2d 485, 487 (1938).
63. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Appeal of Baird, 132 Pa. Super. 573, 580, 1 A.2d 485, 488 (1938).
